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1 Introduction
Industrial policy is the broad range of tools in the hands of the governments
for the promotion of investment in specific firms or sectors of the economy.
Industrial policy includes interventions in the market for credit and foreign
exchange, licensing procedures, trade policies, and direct control of firms
and sectors through state ownership. Such policies appear to have been an
important ingredient in the development of many of today’s rich countries,
including the Western European economies, Japan, as well as the first gen-
eration of the East Asian Tiger economies. Rodrik (1995) argues that a
large component of the “economic miracles” of Taiwan and Singapore should
be ascribed to the active role of the governments in implementing big-push
industrial policies aimed at removing coordination failures in investments.1
Many developing countries today look at these success stories for inspira-
tion on how to engineer growth at home. While many observers agree that
in principle the existence of a wide variety of coordination failures justify the
use of industrial policy, many are sceptical to the ability of governments in
developing countries to replicate the detailed intervention carried out by the
newly industrialized countries. An important reason for this scepticism is
that in an environment of weak political institutions, such policies may be
captured by interest groups and give rise to costly rent seeking (see Bjor-
vatn and Coniglio, 2006, and for empirical evidence on industrial policy and
corruption, Ades and di Tella, 1997).
The present paper emphasizes another reason why poor countries today
should exercise caution when drawing lessons from past experience. Not only
internal conditions may be diﬀerent, but also external conditions are not the
same. In particular, by increasing access to foreign markets, the process of
globalization has reduced the relative importance of the domestic market size
as a limiting factor for industrialization. This change in external conditions
has implications for the optimal policy design.2
The dimension of industrial policy design that we focus on here is the
selectivity of intervention. With limited resources, governments must decide
1See also Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006). For a critical survey on the case for industrial
policy, see Pack and Saggi (2006).
2The international policy environment has also substantially changed in the last decade.
New constraints on national policies are now in place, for instance through WTO agree-
ments, and, at least in principle, the policy-path followed by industrialized countries might
not be feasible for the developing countries of today.
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whether to implement a targeted policy, oﬀering strong investment incentives
to a limited number of firms or sectors, or to implement a more broad based
and neutral policy that gives a moderate stimulus to a wider range of firms
and sectors. The targeted policy would typically be more interventionistic
and associated with the concept of “state led development”, with a substan-
tial degree of state ownership in “strategic” industries and heavy regulation
of the economy. A broad based policy, on the other hand, would be charac-
terized by a more arms-length relation between government and businesses,
with the government seeking to facilitate investment through, say, investing
in infrastructure rather than actively seeking to pick winners. The broad
policy has the advantage of potentially enabling a large number of firms
to upgrade their technology and thereby trigger big push economic growth.
However, the risk is that by spreading government support too thinly, the
policy may fail in creating the necessary stimulus to induce firms to invest.
The question of broadness of policy intervention is not new. This issue
was very much at the forefront of the discussion on big push industrialization
in the 1940s and 1950s. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1961) and Nurkse (1952,
1953) argued that for industrial policy to be successful, it should promote in-
dustrialization in a broad range of sectors simultaneously. Hirshman (1958),
on the other hand, held that industrial policy should be more focused. Given
the scarcity of resources available to policy makers, spreading these resource
too thinly across sectors could thwart any eﬀort of technology upgrading.
Similarly, Rostow (1960) argued that policy should be targeted to promote
investment in a few leading sectors, and then relying on their development
to stimulate technology upgrading in other sectors.
While the question of optimal policy design is not new, the answers may
diﬀer, since the economic environment is not the same. In particular, global-
ization and preferential trade agreements provide countries with the opportu-
nity to grow through exports, and reduce the relative importance of domestic
market size as a constraining factor for investing in large scale production
technology.
Formal analysis of optimal policy design for big push industrialization is
relatively scarce. One exception is Gans (1998). He describes a competitive
downstream sector and an imperfectly competitive upstream sector, charac-
terized by monopolistic competition. Investment in upstream activities may
have both competition eﬀects and market size eﬀects, and the net eﬀect on
profitability is uncertain. Gans assumes that the market size eﬀect appears
only with a lag: Each investor has an incentive to postpone investment, wait-
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ing for other entrepreneurs to invest first and thereby increase the market
size. The market equilibrium may therefore be characterized by a prisoner’s
dilemma, resulting in underinvestment. The government may solve this inef-
ficiency by industrial policy. Gans derives the critical level of upstream firms
necessary to break the waiting game, and thus induce industrialization. The
critical number of upstream investment needed to achieve this, which is a
measure of policy broadness, depends on the discount rate, the size of the
labor force, and the size of fixed investment costs. The higher is the discount
rate, the larger is the labor force, and the lower is fixed investment costs, the
more targeted the policy can be. Our paper adds to the analysis of Gans by
analysing the eﬀect of foreign market access on optimal policy design.
Our paper is also related to Da Rin and Hellman (2002), who discuss
the role that the banking system has played in promoting industrialization
in many countries by coordinating investments. The authors present a big-
push model where the role of banks in inducing the economy to move out
of a poverty trap is analysed. Banks are more likely to solve the initial
coordination failure if they are large enough and if they have suﬃcient market
access. A corollary stemming out of their model is that government control of
the banking system may be crucial in the industrialization process. While Da
Rin and Hellman analyse the positive role of the banking system in activating
(or failing to activate) big-push industrialization, our aim is to analyse the
eﬃciency of diﬀerent policy designs in an open economy framework.
We base our theoretical analysis on the dual technology, limit pricing
model of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). The point of departure is a
poor country with limited access to foreign markets. The domestic market
size is therefore of crucial importance in determining the profitability of in-
vestment. In the absence of government intervention, the country is caught
in a poverty trap. The trap is explained by a demand side externality which
causes a coordination failure: firms do not internalize the eﬀect of their in-
vestment on aggregate income and hence aggregate demand. A coordinated
investment, by expanding the domestic market size, would make investment
profitable for each entrepreneur. However, no individual entrepreneur has
the incentive to invest in an economy dominated by traditional production.
There is thus a rationale for government intervention to stimulate investment.
Our main argument is that the eﬃciency of industrial policy depends on
the country’s openness to the outside world. With good access to foreign
markets, broad based industrial policies are more likely to be successful than
targeted policies. Intuitively, with a suﬃcient “pull” from international mar-
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kets, entrepreneurs require a smaller “push” in the form of, say, investment
incentives, in order to invest in more advanced technology. Hence, in a rela-
tively open economy, a wider range of firms and industries can successfully
be reached by broad based industrial policies like investments in public in-
frastructure. In a more closed economy, on the other hand, the market size
is more limited, and each firm needs stronger direct support to invest. This
is an argument in favor of more targeted intervention. Our results also have
implications for policy reform. Deregulation and privatization may stimulate
economic growth in a relatively open economy. In a more closed economy,
however, these reforms may lead to de-industrialization.
We present empirical evidence in support of the main conclusions from
the theoretical model. Our regression analysis shows that government inter-
vention in developing countries is positively correlated with economic growth
in less open economies, but negatively correlated with growth in more open
economies. Similarly, deregulation is associated with higher growth in rela-
tively open economies, and lower growth in relatively closed economies.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some simple
correlations between government intervention and economic growth. This
first glance at the data suggests that the correlation between intervention and
growth may be qualitatively diﬀerent in relatively closed economies compared
to more open economies. The theoretical model is analysed in Section 3. Our
regression analysis is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 First glance at the data
Governments may intervene in many ways. Our interest is mainly in the de-
gree to which governments choose targeted interventions versus more neutral
policies. In developing countries, which we focus on here, selective indus-
trial policy is typically carried out through state owned enterprises (SOEs).
These enterprises are typically heavily subsidized, absorbing resources that
could otherwise have been used to support private sector investment. For in-
stance, according to the World Bank (1995), subsidies to SOEs in Tanzania
amounted to 72 percent of government spending on education and 150 per-
cent of health expenditure. In Bangladesh, the same study reports that SOEs
take about one fifth of domestic credit, although their output accounts for
less than three percent of GDP. As witnessed by the experience of reformist
countries, such as Chile, South Korea and Mexico, an important ingredient
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in a shift towards a less interventionistic industrial policy is the reduction in
state ownership in manufacturing and banking.
We shall use the index of Government Intervention constructed by the
Fraser Institute (2001) in our empirical study. This index measures the rela-
tive importance of SOEs and government investment in a country’s economy.
The index ranges from 0 to 10, where a high value reflects more interven-
tionistic policies.3 For instance, the index 10 is given to countries that are
“dominated by SOEs and government investment exceeded 50% of the to-
tal”, while an index 2 (the lowest measure for a developing countries in our
dataset) indicates “few SOEs other than those involved in industries where
economies of scale reduce the eﬀectiveness of competition (e.g. power gener-
ation) and government investment was between 15% and 20% of the total.”4
Figure 1 shows the correlation between our chosen measure of government
intervention for the year 1980 and economic growth, measured as average
growth in real GDP per capita. The data covers 56 non-OECD countries, for
the period 1980-1992. A first simple look at the data suggests that developing
countries with more interventionistic policies tended to have slower growth
during the period analysed (with a negative slope 0.27, significant at the 10%
level).
We now split the sample into two equally sized subgroups according to
the degree of openness of the economy, measured as real exports and imports
as a share of GDP for the year 1980. The first subgroup of countries is less
open to trade (with trade constituting less than approximately 60% of GDP).
Interestingly, we observe from Figure 2 that there is a positive association
between the degree of government intervention and average growth of GDP
for this group of countries (although the slope of 0.22 is not statistically
significant at the 10% level, its P-value being 14%).
For the group of countries which are more open to trade, on the other
hand, the growth rate is clearly higher the less interventionistic are govern-
ment policies. This is shown in Figure 3 (the slope is -0.95, significant at the
1% level).
The qualitative diﬀerence in the relation between government interven-
tion and growth shown in Figure 2 and 3, together with the fact that we use
initial values of government intervention and openness and subsequent levels
3In order to provide a more intuitive and straightforward interpretation, we have in-
verted the scale of the original index.
4See Fraser Institute, 2001, page 14. See also Appendix 1 for a full description of the
goverment intervention index.
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Figure 1: Intervention and growth
of growth, suggest that government intervention may have a causal eﬀect on
economic growth, and that this eﬀect may be diﬀerent in relatively closed
economies compared to more open economies. The simple correlations re-
ported above of course only represent a first look at the data. Still, they are
indicative of a diﬀerent association between growth and degree of government
intervention in the two groups of countries. We shall explore the relation be-
tween economic growth and policy in somewhat more depth in Section 4. In
what now follows, we develop a theoretical model that highlights how the
degree of openness may be decisive in determining the success or failure of
industrial policies and policy change.
3 Model
Consider a developing country with labor as the only factor of production.
Initially, all L workers are engaged in production using traditional, constant
returns to scale technology, with one unit of labour producing one unit of out-
put. Some of the workers, their number given by η, have the entrepreneurial
talent necessary to improve the production technology. Each entrepreneur
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Figure 2: Intervention and growth: Less open economies
can only be involved in one production activity. The modern production
technology is increasing returns to scale and described by the following labor
input requirement:
lirs = f + βxirs, (1)
where f is the fixed investment cost and β < 1 is the marginal labor input
requirement in production. Since, strictly speaking, there is no capital in the
model, we can think of f as the number of white collar workers required to
administer the firm and hence not involved in the production process as such.
The goods produced locally are also supplied on the international market.
The international market in the present analysis aﬀects the domestic economy
in two ways. First, the international price defines the domestic price and
hence domestic labor income. Second, the international market is a source of
sales for modern domestic producers. Regarding the first point, abstracting
from trade costs, traditional producers in the developing country charge a
price exactly equal to the price on the international market in order to stay
competitive with imports. Normalizing the international price to unity, this
also defines income per worker in traditional production. Since there are
no gains from trade in a traditional economy, small scale producers can be
seen as supplying only local demand. With only traditional production, the
8
2
4
6
8
10
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Economic growth (1980-92)
Intervention (1980) Fitted values
Figure 3: Intervention and growth: More open economies
economy is therefore eﬀectively an autarky.
Regarding the second point, upgrading to increasing returns to scale tech-
nology opens up for profitable exports. The level of exports from a modern
producer in the developing country is given by x, which is exogenously given,
determined by for instance capacity constraints in export facilities in the de-
veloping country and/or barriers to trade in the importing countries. Such
barriers to trade have been, and to some extent continue to be, important
for a large number of goods for which developing countries have a compara-
tive advantage, including agricultural products, textiles, clothing, footwear,
leather goods, etc.
The profit maximizing strategy of a modern firm is limit pricing, choos-
ing a price (marginally below) the price of unity. In this way, a modern firm
captures the entire market for its product at home and produces x for the
international market. We shall assume that x and η, the number of entrepre-
neurs, are suﬃciently small so that there are always some workers at home
involved in traditional production. These workers represent a resource that
can be mobilized to satisfy increased labor demand from modern producers,
without placing an upward pressure on the wage level in the economy.
While the production workers in the modern sector are simply paid their
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alternative wage of unity, the administrative staﬀ receives a wage premium
w.5 Hence, the fixed cost of a modern production plant is f (1 + w).
Assuming equal budget shares in domestic demand, and normalizing the
number of goods in the economy to unity, local sales for each modern firm,
xirs, equals total income y. In addition to local sales, each modern firm earns
x from exports. Using the equilibrium condition that xirs = y + x and the
technology given by (1), the profits for a modern sector producer can be
expressed as:
πi = (y + x) (1− β)− f (1 + w) + si, (2)
where si = s if the firm receives support, and si = 0 if it does not receive
support. We shall assume that the government has access to resources S
that can be used for stimulating investment. Let n1 denote the number of
sectors targeted by the policy, with each investor receiving s = S/n1. Hence,
n1 measures the degree to which industrial policy is targeted. We shall
assume that S is an additional resource available for the economy such as
foreign aid. The government has to decide how to allocate S between sectors.
A broad policy would imply spreading S thinly across a large number of
sectors. We can think of it as investment in infrastructure. For instance,
an upgrading of electricity supply reduces the need for firms to invest in
expensive power generators at the plant level. A more targeted intervention
would be associated with a larger support for a smaller set of sectors, for
instance in the form of subsidized credit or subsidized foreign exchange.
Let the number of investing firms be given by n ≤ η. Local demand
facing each modern firm is therefore given by:
y = l + nπ + nfw, (3)
where l is basic labor income and nfw is the additional income to the
administrative staﬀ of the n modern sector firms. When making an invest-
ment decision, the entrepreneur takes the income level in the economy as
given. Thus, he does not internalize the eﬀect of his own investment on ag-
gregate income. Neither does he internalize the eﬀect of his own investment
on the investment decisions of other entrepreneurs. Hence, there will be a
diﬀerence between perceived profits and realized profits, and this is a source
of ineﬃciency in the investment choices.
5As shown in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), a wage markup in the modern sector
is necessary to create the demand externality underlying the coordination failure.
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We shall assume the diﬀerence between perceived and realized profits
gives rise to a coordination failure. Such a failure exists if in an economy
characterized by only traditional producers, and where there is no govern-
ment intervention (so that S = 0 and n = 0), the perceived profit of invest-
ment is negative. At the same time, a coordinated upgrading of technology
by all η entrepreneurs would result in positive profits. Perceived profits from
investing in a purely traditional economy, with no subsidies, are given by:
πtrad = (l + x) (1− β)− f (1 + w) . (4)
The condition that investment is unprofitable in this environment can be
expressed as:
πtrad < 0⇒ f >
(l + x) (1− β)
1 + w
≡ f1. (5)
Similarly, when all entrepreneurs invest, and subsidies are zero, local de-
mand is y = l + ηπ + ηfw and profits are given by
πmod =
(l + x+ ηfr) (1− β)− f (1 + w)
1− η (1− β) . (6)
We can then find that:
πmod > 0⇒ f <
(l + x) (1− β)
1 + w − wη (1− β) ≡ f2. (7)
Clearly, f2 > f1 for any η > 0. A coordination failure therefore exists if
the following condition holds:
f1 < f < f2. (8)
The presence of a coordination failure provides a motive for industrial
policy. Given an initial situation with only traditional production, govern-
ment intervention is necessary to induce investment. If the perceived profits
of a subsidized investment is positive, an investment will take place. Once
an investment by subsidized firms has taken place, also the profitability of
investment by entrepreneurs who do not directly benefit from subsidies will
change. If the policy is successful, the increase in income generated by the
first round of investment expands the market and may thus make investment
profitable also for latter group. In this way, although the model is not explic-
itly dynamic, we can think about investment as (potentially) taking place in
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“waves”, with subsidized investors taking part in the first wave (which we de-
note with subscript 1), and the unsubsidized investors in the second (denoted
by subscript 2).
3.1 First wave investment
In a purely traditional economy, profits are zero and hence the perceived
local demand facing the subsidized, first wave investors is yˆ1 = l. Perceived
profits are therefore given by:
πˆ1 = (l + x) (1− β)− f (1 + w) + s. (9)
Since s = S/n1, the break-even condition for the subsidized investors can
be expressed as:
πˆ1 > 0⇒ n1 <
S
f (1 + w)− (l + x) (1− β) ≡ nˆ1. (10)
Note that in a relatively closed economy (with a low x), the industrial
policy needs to be suﬃciently focused, i.e., n1 < nˆ1, in order to spark oﬀ a
first round of investment. In this way, nˆ1 shows the maximum broadness of
policy, given the public resource constraint S, that will induce a first wave of
investment. We observe that nˆ1 increases in x and l and falls in w, f , and β:
An increase in market size (domestic or foreign) increases the chances that a
broad based policy will stimulate a first wave of investment. Increased fixed
costs (w and/or f) or higher variable production costs (higher β) make a
broad based policy less likely to succeed in this respect.
Given a first round of investment, realized income and demand facing each
investor is y1 = l + n1 (π1 + fw). Realized first wave profits are therefore:
π1 =
(l + x+ n1fw) (1− β)− f (1 + w) + s
1− n1 (1− β)
. (11)
The success of the policy is associated with its ability to induce investment
in technology upgrading also in those sectors not directly supported by the
government. If the policy fails to do so, the first wave investment is not
sustainable, in the sense that without support, the economy will fall back
to the traditional equilibrium. In the following paragraphs we explore the
necessary conditions for the policy to create a big push, which moves the
economy to the fully industrialized equilibrium.
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3.2 Second wave investment
Only first wave investors are oﬀered subsidies. The perceived income of a
second wave investor, yˆ2, equals the actual income after the first wave of
investment, y1. Using (11) in (3), the expected profit of a second wave
investor can be expressed as:
πˆ2 =
(l + x+ n1w + S) (1− β)− f (1 + w)
1− n1 (1− β)
. (12)
From the above expression it can easily be noted that πˆ2 rises in n1.
Hence, the broader is the policy and therefore the larger is the number of
first wave investors, the higher are perceived profits for potential second wave
investors. The critical number of first wave investors necessary to make a
second wave investment profitable can be found as:
πˆ2 > 0⇒ n1 >
f (1 + w)− (x+ l + S) (1− β)
(1− β)w ≡ n
∗
1. (13)
We observe that n∗1 is falling in x and l, and increasing in w, f and
β: An increase in x or l means a larger market size and therefore a larger
profitability of second wave investment for any given number of first wave
investors. An increase in x or l therefore lowers the critical number of first
wave investments necessary to make the second wave investment profitable.
A higher w or f represent increased fixed costs while a higher β represents
higher variable production costs, which make a second wave investment less
likely.
Figure 4 illustrates the eﬀect of changes in market access on the optimal
industrial policy.6
The nˆ1-curve shows the maximum broadness of industrial policy necessary
to generate a first wave of investment. Spreading the given budget for indus-
trial support S too thinly across firms, i.e., choosing n1 > nˆ1 will not create
any industrialization at all: The critical mass of support is not provided, and
no entrepreneur has an incentive to upgrade to modern technology. Policy
needs to be suﬃciently targeted, i.e., n1 < nˆ1, in order to induce investment.
If a suﬃciently large number of firms have participated in the first wave of
investment, the eﬀect on aggregate demand may be strong enough to create
a second wave of investment. This happens when nˆ1 > n1 > n∗1. For n1 <
6In Figure 1, f = w = β = l = 12 , S =
1
5 .
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Figure 4: Openness, policy design, and industrialization
n∗1, the number of first wave investors is not suﬃciently large to create full
industrialization; there is only “partial industrialization”, with investment
limited to the number of subsidized entrepreneurs. For n1 > n∗1, the economy
achieves full industrialization, since also the unsubsidized entrepreneurs will
find it profitable to invest.
Consider four countries, a, b, c and d. Countries a and b are relatively
closed, with x = xab, while c and d are relatively open, x = xcd. Countries
a and c pursue a targeted policy, n1 = nac, while b and d pursue a broad
based policy, n1 = nbd. Clearly, for the relatively closed economies a and b,
the targeted policy is the more successful one: Country a achieves partial
industrialization, whereas country b realizes no industrialization at all. For
the more open economies c and d, the broad based policy is more successful:
Country c only achieves partial industrialization, while the industrial policy
in d generates full industrialization. We can therefore conclude that:
Proposition 1 In a relatively closed economy, a targeted industrial policy
is likely to generate higher economic growth than a broad based policy. In a
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more open economy, a broad based policy is likely to generate higher economic
growth than a targeted policy.
Our model also sheds light on the eﬃciency of policy reform. Consider
the two countries a and c in Figure 4. A broadening of industrial policy, for
instance imposed on the countries by outside donors as a condition for con-
tinued aid, will for the relatively closed country a lead to de-industrialization
and therefore slower economic growth. For country c, on the other hand,
the same policy reform will lead to increased industrialization and growth.
Hence, we can state that:
Corollary 1 In a relatively closed economy, a policy reform towards more
broad based intervention may lead to de-industrialization and slower economic
growth. In a more open economy, the same policy reform is more likely to
lead to increased investment and higher economic growth.
4 Regression analysis
The theoretical model presented above suggests that the eﬀectiveness of in-
dustrial policy in moving the economy out of a poverty trap crucially depends
on policy design and the degree of openness to trade. In particular, we have
analysed how the degree of selectivity versus broadness of interventions af-
fects the outcome. The model shows that in relatively open economies, broad
based industrial policies are more likely to be conducive to growth than tar-
geted policies. In countries with a lower degree of openness, on the other
hand, targeting a given set of existing firms and sectors might be more eﬀec-
tive.
Section 2 presented a first glance at the data. We now include explana-
tory variables typically used in growth regressions to investigate whether the
simple correlations presented in Section 2 survive in a more complete, but of
course still parsimonious, model of growth. The dependent variable is real
GDP per capita growth, averaged over the period 1980-1992. The explana-
tory variables employed in the empirical analysis (see Appendix 1 and 2 for
more details) are the following: real GDP per capita in 1980 (in log); private
savings in the economy as a share of disposable income; the ethnic fractional-
ization index used by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001); a dummy variable
for countries in Latin America; neighbors’ growth, which is the aggregate
growth rate of neighboring countries between 1970 and 1989 as formulate
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by Sachs and Warner (1997); openness, measured as the import plus export
as a ratio of a country’s GDP at the beginning of the period (1980); the
Government Intervention index for 1980, mentioned above and described in
Appendix 1. In addition, we consider the change in the intervention-index
that occurred between 1980 and 1990. This variable captures the eﬀect on
growth of a policy shift toward more (or perhaps less) selective government
intervention in the economy. The results are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Regression results
Dependent variable is average real GDP growth per capita, 1980-1992
Regression (A) (B) (C) (D)
Real GDP per capita 1980 (ln) −0.57 −0.66 −0.48 −0.59
(0.48) (0.43) (0.51) (0.44)
Private savings 14.8 13.08 14.93 12.54
(3.34)∗∗ (3.37)∗∗ (3.7)∗∗ (3.8)∗∗
Neighbours’ growth 0.38 0.32 0.44 0.33
(0.14)∗∗ (0.13)∗ (0.15)∗∗ (0.13)∗
Ethnic fractionalization −3.4 −3.4 −3.16 −3.13
(0.86)∗∗ (0.77)∗∗ (0.92)∗∗ (0.83)∗∗
Latin America −1.72 −1.66 −1.53 −1.91
(0.74)∗ (0.71)∗ (0.61)∗ (0.72)∗
Openness in 1980 (ln) 0.01 6.9 −0.29 6.01
(0.61) (2.22)∗∗ (0.62) (2.36)∗
Government Intervention −0.09 3.25 2.92
(0.12) (1.09)∗∗ (1.12)∗
Openness*Gmnt Intervention −0.84 −0.77
(0.27)∗∗ (0.28)∗∗
Change in Gmnt Intervention 3.4 2.4
(1.00)∗∗ (1.13)∗
Openness*Change in Gmnt Interv −0.85 −0.63
(0.27)∗∗ (0.29)∗
Constant 4.30 −22.17 3.81 −18.72
(3.54) (9.94)∗∗ (3.75) (10.2)∗
Observations 45 45 45 45
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.63 0.58 0.64
Robust standard errors in parantheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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We report estimations only for the non-OECD countries for which data
are available in the sample.7 We observe from regression (A) that the esti-
mated coeﬃcient on the openness variable is not statistically diﬀerent from
zero. In regressions (B) we introduce Government Intervention and its inter-
action eﬀect with our measure of openness. Both variables are statistically
significant. Finally, in the last two regressions, (C ) and (D), we add the
change in Government Intervention between 1980 and 1990 and its interac-
tion eﬀect with openness.
Focusing on the last regression, the results show that the growth eﬀect
of industrial policy (and of its change over the period consider) depends on
the country’s openness to trade. In particular, countries with a less domi-
nant role of the state in the economy, through SOEs and public investment,
seem to experience higher growth when they are relatively open to foreign
trade. However, in line with the prediction of the theoretical model, the data
show that a more selective industrial policy might induce stronger growth in
countries with limited access to foreign markets. For instance, abstracting
from changes in Government Intervention over time, the eﬀect on economic
growth of a change in the level of intervention can be found as:
∂ (GDP growth)
∂(Gmnt Interv)
= 2.92− 0.77 ∗ (Openness)
We observe that the critical level of openness above which increased selec-
tivity of industrial policy is growth enhancing is Openness = 3.79, which is
equivalent to a share of exports and imports in GDP of 44 percent. From this
analysis we see that only countries that have a suﬃcient amount of trade can
expect a positive growth eﬀect from policy reforms towards a more neutral
industrial policy.
Although the analysis presented in this section is not a direct test of the
theorethical model presented above, the findings go in the direction high-
lighted by Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 from the theoretical model. Hence
for many poor countries which are still marginal in the global economy it
might be unwise to give up attempts to stimulate key sectors of the economy
through selective industrial policy.
7In the regression analysis, we also leave out six major oil exporting countries (Gabon,
Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela) and one extremely open economy
(Singapore).
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5 Conclusion
What role should governments play in promoting economic growth? This is a
long-standing and highly controversial question in the political and economic
debate. Clearly, in some countries, interventionistic policies appear to have
contributed positively in promoting industrialization and growth. In other
cases, government intervention has had the opposite eﬀect. One reason for
this diverging experience with industrial policies is likely to be diﬀerences
in governments’ ability to design and implement policies. However, it may
also be the case that a similar policy design, and a similar quality of imple-
mentation, can have diﬀerent eﬀects in diﬀerent countries, depending on the
economic environment in which the polices take place.
The dimension of the economic environment that we focus on in the
present paper is the openness of a country, or more precisely, foreign market
access, as determined by for instance geography, trade costs, and trade poli-
cies in the major importing countries. We develop a theoretical model that
analyses the growth eﬀect of industrial policy. The model-economy is one
characterized by a coordination failure in the investment decision, caused by
demand externalities. In this situation, government intervention can play
a role in stimulating investment. Governments may choose to implement a
hands-on, targeted industrial policy or choose a more arms-length approach,
trying to stimulate investment by, say, upgrading the general infrastructure.
The main conclusion from the theoretical model is that targeted policies are
likely to be more successful in generating economic growth in relatively closed
economies, and that broad based policies are likely to be more successful in
more open economies. An interesting policy implication from this finding is
that countries with relatively limited access to foreign markets should think
twice before implementing policies of deregulation and privatization.
The general message from the model finds support in the data. We use the
importance of state owned enterprises and government investment as a proxy
for the degree of direct government involvement, and thus the selectivity
of industrial policy. The regression analysis on a sample of 45 developing
countries shows that broad based policies have a positive impact in growth
only in relatively open economies. In less open economies, interventionistic
policies are associated with stronger growth. Similarly, the data shows that
reducing the direct involvement of the government in markets, for instance
through deregulation and/or privatization, has a positive eﬀect on growth
only in relatively open economies. Indeed, in relatively closed economies,
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such policy reforms are associated with slower economic growth.
When seeking inspiration from earlier growth successes inWestern Europe
and East Asia, policymakers should keep in mind that not only internal con-
ditions (such as the degree of corruption and rent-seeking) might be diﬀerent
but that also external conditions, such as openness to trade and in general the
degree of integration with the world economy, may not be identical to past
experiences. While increased economic integration between countries has re-
duced the relative importance of domestic markets and thereby reduced the
case for selective big push policies, many poor countries continue to lay on
the border of globalization. In these cases, the lessons from Hirshman (1958)
and Rostow (1960) are still relevant.
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Appendix 1. Desription of variables
Table A1. Summary statistics
Variable name Mean Stand. dev.
Real GDP growth (per capita, average over 1980-92) 0.14 2.75
Real GDP per capita in 1980 (ln) 7.69 0.86
Private savings 0.16 0.09
Neighbors’ growth 1.16 1.75
Ethnic fractionalization 0.39 0.31
Openness 4.1 0.67
Government intervention 6.54 2.59
Change in government intervention −0.81 1.67
Openness*Government intervention 29.43 10.25
Openness*Change in government intervention −3.42 6.53
Variable description and sources
• Real GDP growth (per capita, average over 1980-92): Growth rate of
real per capita GDP, average over 1980-92; calculated as geometric
growth rate. Source: Demirguc-Kunt A. And R. Levine (2001).
• Real GDP per capita in 1980 (ln): Log of the real GDP per capita in
1980. Source: Demirguc-Kunt A. And R. Levine (2001).
• Private savings: Ratio of gross private saving to gross private disposable
income; average over 1980-95. Source: Loayza, Lopez, Schmidt-Hebbel,
and Serven (1998)
• Neighbors’ growth: Average annual growth of neighbouring economies
between 1970 and 1989. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997).
• Ethnic fractionalization: Average value of five indices of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, with values ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values
denote higher levels of fractionalization. Source: Demirguc-Kunt A.
And R. Levine (2001).
• Latin America: Dummy variable equal to 1 for Latin American coun-
tries.
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• Openness: Real exports and imports as percentage share of real GDP
in1980 (ln). Source: Loayza, Lopez, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (1998).
• Index of Government Intervention in 1980: Variable measuring the
degree and extensiveness of government intervention in the economy.
The variable is constructed by the Fraser Institute and is one of the
many components of the Economic Freedom of the World Index. Data
on the number, composition, and share of output supplied by State-
Operated Enterprises (SOEs) and government investment as a share of
total investment are used to construct the 0-to-10 ratings (low ratings
for countries with less government enterprise and government invest-
ment and high ratings for governments with many SOE and a high
share of government investment on total investment). “When there
were few SOEs and government investment was generally less than
15% of total investment, countries were given a rating of 0. When
there were few SOEs other than those involved in industries where
economies of scale reduce the eﬀectiveness of competition (e.g., power
generation) and government investment was between 15% and 20% of
the total, countries received a rating of 2. When there were, again,
few SOEs other than those involved in energy and other such indus-
tries and government investment was between about 20% and 25% of
the total, countries were rated at 3. When SOEs were present in the
energy, transportation, and communication sectors of the economy and
government investment was between about 25% and 30% of the to-
tal, countries were assigned a rating of 4. When a substantial number
of SOEs operated in many sectors, including manufacturing, and gov-
ernment investment was generally between 30% and 40% of the total,
countries received a rating of 6. When numerous SOEs operated in
many sectors, including retail sales, and government investment was
between about 40% and 50% of the total, countries were rated at 8. A
rating of 10 was assigned when the economy was dominated by SOEs
and government investment exceeded 50% of the total.” Source: Fraser
Institute (2001).
• Change in government intervention: Change in the Index of Govern-
ment Intervention between 1980 and 1990. Positive values indicate
an increase in the degree of public intervention through State-Owned-
Enterprises and in the share of public investment. Negative values
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indicate a decreasing government intervention in the economy over the
decade. Source: Fraser Institute (2001)
• Openness*Government intervention: Interaction eﬀects between ’open-
ness’ and ’Government intervention’. Source: Fraser Institute (2001)
and Loayza, Lopez, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (1998).
• Openness*Change in government intervention: Interaction eﬀect be-
tween ’openness’ and ’Change in government intervention’. Source:
Fraser Institute (2001) and Loayza, Lopez, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Ser-
ven (1998)
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Appendix 2. List of countries included in the sample
High degree of government intervention in 1980 (Interv-80>7)
Country Interv-80 Interv-90 Openness Growth 1980-92
Bangladesh 8 8 26.6 2.8
Bolivia 8 10 31.3 −1.2
Botswana 8 8 124.8 1.4
Brazil 8 4 15.3 −0.9
Burundi 10 10 33.3 1.4
Colombia 8 8 31.2 1.1
Congo 10 8 106.1 1.2
Cote d’Ivoire 10 8 69.0 −4.0
Ecuador 8 3 59.2 −1.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 8 8 76.0 1.1
Ghana 10 8 61.3 −0.2
Guyana 10 10 199.5 −5.7
India 10 10 15.6 3.1
Israel 8 8 66.6 1.8
Jamaica 8 4 76.4 0.3
Jordan 10 10 29.7 −1.5
Kenya 10 10 67.9 0.0
Madagascar 10 10 72.4 −4.0
Malawi 10 10 78.3 −0.9
Mexico 8 6 42.4 0.3
Morocco 8 6 49.4 0.9
Pakistan 10 10 40.1 2.1
Sierra Leone 8 10 74.8 −3.7
Syrian Arab Rep. 10 10 51.6 −1.0
South Africa 8 6 60.0 −1.1
Sri Lanka 8 6 65.4 2.5
Taiwan, China 8 8 79.1 5.9
Togo 10 10 82.3 −2.7
Tunisia 10 8 84.3 1.6
Trinidad and Tobago 8 6 43.2 −2.8
Turkey 8 6 20.3 2.3
Zaire 10 10 31.3 −1.3
Zambia 10 10 101.1 −3.0
Zimbabwe 8 8 58.5 −0.3
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Low degree of government intervention in 1980 (Interv-80<7)
Country Interv-80 Interv-90 Openness Growth 1980-92
Argentina 6 4 20.0 −3.2
Cameroon 6 6 36.4 −1.2
Chile 6 3 66.4 1.9
Costa Rica 6 4 61.1 −0.3
Cyprus 2 2 93.6 4.6
Dominican Republic 6 4 86.2 −0.3
El Salvador 4 2 54.2 −0.6
Guatemala 2 2 54.9 −1.1
Haiti 4 4 40.0 −2.4
Honduras 4 4 59.2 −0.8
Korea, Republic of 3 3 62.3 7.7
Malaysia 6 6 101.2 3.4
Malta 6 4 187.4 4.3
Mauritius 6 6 107.0 3.6
Panama 6 3 86.0 −0.1
Paraguay 2 2 57.6 −1.3
Peru 6 2 29.5 −2.6
Philippines 4 2 51.2 −0.9
Rwanda 6 6 21.8 0.1
Senegal 6 4 55.6 −0.1
Thailand 6 3 51.1 4.9
Uruguay 6 4 39.1 0.2
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